Kentucky Law Journal
Volume 36

Issue 3

Article 15

1948

Contract Liability of Water Companies to Citizens in Kentucky
Harry B. Miller Jr.
University of Kentucky

Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj
Part of the Contracts Commons, State and Local Government Law Commons, and the Water Law
Commons

Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits you.
Recommended Citation
Miller, Harry B. Jr. (1948) "Contract Liability of Water Companies to Citizens in Kentucky," Kentucky Law
Journal: Vol. 36: Iss. 3, Article 15.
Available at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj/vol36/iss3/15

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UKnowledge. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Kentucky Law Journal by an authorized editor of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact
UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.

CONTRACT LIABILITY OF WATER COMPANIES TO
CITIZENS IN KENTUCKY
It is generally recognized that a third party may maintain an
action on a contract made for his benefit. This applies only to cases
where the contract is made with the intent of conferring a benefit
on the third party. The fact that one may receive a benefit from the
performance of the contract is not alone sufficient to give him a right
on the contract. Under various situations it is frequently difficult to
determine whether a third person who will benefit by the performance of a contract is an intended beneficiary' or merely an incidental
beneficiary having no right thereon. This is especially true in regard
to contracts between municipalities and public utilities. The performance of these contracts by the utilities in furnishing light, power,
water, and facilities for communication and transportation at the
rates and according to certain standards prescribed in the contracts
are certainly beneficial to the citizens of the municipality, but
whether the citizens, as individuals, have rights under the contract
and may recover for the breach thereof depends upon whether there
was an intent by the parties that citizens should be directly benefited.
The real question to be asked is whether the city counsel when
making the contract stipulated that there should be a certain water
pressure in order to protect the public buildings only or whether
they intend that the citizen living on the highest hill in town should
have adequate pressure at all times. The majority of the jurisdictions have held the former to be the intent and have denied citizens
recovery on the ground that they were incidentally benefited.' Kentucky in Paducah Lumber Company v. PaducahWater Supply Company' held that the citizen was the intended beneficiary. In this case
the water company, acting under a franchise, undertook to supply
water to the citizens of the city of Paducah. The court in holding the
defendant liable said:
"It seems, if the contract before us is not to be
treated as meaningless and totally ineffectual for every
purpose, the parties to it must be regarded as having
contemplated and assented to the consequences of nonperformance,
and consequently appellee [water
company] is liable in this case for such damages as its
2 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (rev. ed. 1936) sec. 356.
(1932) sec. 147; 2 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (rev. ed 1936) secs. 402, 403.
'Cole v. Arizona Edison Co., 53 Ariz. 141, 86 P 2d 946 (1939),
Prindle v. Sharon Water Co., 105 Conn. 151, 134 Atl. 807 (1926);
Consolidated Biscuit Co. v. Illinois Iowa Power Co., 303 Ill. App.
80, 24 N.E. 2d 582 (1939).
' 89 Ky. 340, 12 S. W 554 (1889).
2
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failure or
5 refusal to perform may have caused to appellant."
The court here assumed that the citizens were the intended
beneficiaries of the contract made by the city and that the privity
of the parties was an outgrowth of the agreement which, in effect,
was made with the citizens individually through their central
medium, the officials of the town.' This case has been summarily
dismissed by the majority of the courts, either with the statement
that it is the minority view and does not apply, or that there was a
private contract between the water company and the lumber company, and hence was decided on this ground The first reason results
in a curt dismissal of the case without challenging the merits of the
Kentucky analysis of the problem; the second is a misnomer, as the
court explicitly stated that even if there had been no private contract involved, the case would have rested on the contract between
the city and the water company and have been decided the same
way
The view and the reasoning propounded by the Kentucky court
have been adopted in toto by the courts of North Carolina and
Florida."°
The majority of the courts refusing to allow the citizen to recover, have based their denial upon either or both of the following
grounds: (1) that there is lack of privity" and (2) that it was not
the intention of the water company to become an indemnifier in
case of harm to an individual citizen.'"
Ky. 340, 352, 12 S. W 554, 557 (1889)
Clay v. Catlettsburg, Kenova & Ceredo Water Co., 301 Ky.
456, 192 S. W 2d 385 (1946),, Kentucky Utilities Co. v. Farmer's
Co-Op. Stock Yards Co., 246 Ky 40, 54 S. W 2d 364 (1932), Harlan
Water Co. v. Carter, 220 Ky. 493, 295 S. W 426 (1927), Mountain
Water Co. v Davis, 195 Ky. 193, 241 S. W 801 (1922), Tobm v.
Frankfort Water Co., 158 Ky 348, 164 S. W 956 (1914); Kenton
Water Co. v. Glenn, 141 Ky 529, 133 S. W 573 (1911)- Georgetown
Water, Gas,.Flectric & Power Co. v. Neale, 137 Ky. 197, 125 S. W.
293 (1910)" Lexington Hydraulic & Manufacturing Co. v. Oots, 119
Ky 598, 84 S. W 774 (1905) Graves County Water Co. v. Ligon,
112 Ky. 775, 66 S. W 725 (1902).
7Town of Ukiah City v. Ukiah Water & Improvement Co., 142
,Cal. 173, 75 Pac. 773 (1904).
"Mott v. Cherryvale Water & Manuf'g. Co., 48 Kan. 12, 28
Pac. 989 (1892) Hone v. Presque Isle Water Co., 104 Me. 217, 71
Atl. 769 (1908).
SGorell v. Greensboro Water Supply Co., 124 N. C. 328, 32 S. E.
720 (1899)
'°Mugge v. Tampa Waterworks Co., 52 Fla. 371, 42 So. 81
(1906).
,IEllis v. Birmingham Waterworks Co., 187 Ala. 552, 65 So.
805 (1914) Blunk v. Dennison Water Supply Co., 71 Ohio St. 250,
73 N.2 E. 210 (1905).
' 1. R. Moch Co., Inc. v. Rensselaer Water Co., 247 N. Y. 160,
159 N. E. 896 (1928).
-89
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The key note case stressing lack of privity, and holding against
the citizen, seems to be that of Nickerson v. Brtdgeport Hydraulic
Company." In this case, the plaintiff's property was destroyed by a
fire which could have been extinguished if the pressure stipulated in
the franchise had been available. The court held that the property
owner was a stranger to the agreement with the muicipality, and
therefore could not maintain an action against the company for a
breach of contract. It is interesting to note that this case, which has
been quoted extensively as authority, was decided during the early
growth of the rights of enforcement by third party beneficiaries and
at the time of the decision no third party beneficiary could enforce
an agreement in Connecticut." Furthermore, the court found the
pleading insufficient to prove any contract with the city much less
one with the plaintiff, and'it was primarily on this ground that the
case was dismissed.
The federal rule appears to be in accord with the majority.
However, the case most extensively quoted as authority is that of
German Alliance Insurance Company v. Home Water Supply Company" which involved the subrogation rights of an insurance company for damage done to one of its policy holder's property by the
water company's failure. The court held no liability but the same
result would have been reached by the Kentucky court.
In William Burford & Company v. Glasgow Water Company,"
the insurer had paid claims for destruction by fire when the defendant company failed to furnish the pressure agreed upon. The
court in denying recovery said:
"The water company is entitled to live and to make
a fair return on the investment. To meet the increased
liability, higher water rates will be necessary. The
added burden will fall on the consumers. The result will
be that the citizen and property owners will not only
pay for fire protection premiums sufficient to cover the
risk assumed, but will also pay higher water rates for
the purpose of relieving the insurance companies of the
liability which they have been paid-to assume." 17
The Kentucky court here has put forward perhaps the best
argument in favor of the water company's position. It points out
that by allowing the insurance company to recover it would throw
the eventual cost upon the individual consumer. This reasoning is
equally, valid when applied to the property owner for whenever the
water company pays a loss it ip a deduction of their rate of profit
and if a number of such deductions are made, the water rate must
"46 Conn. 24, 33 Am. Rep. 1 (1878)
"Corbin, Contracts for the Benefit of Thzrd Parties in Connecticut (1922) 31 YALE L. J. 489.
' 226 U. S. 220, 57 L. Ed. 195, 33 Sup. Ct. 32 (1912).
16223 Ky. 54, 2 S. W 2d 1027 (1928).
'7 Id. at 57-58, 2 S. W 2d at 1029.
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advance to assure the water companies a fair return on their invest-

ment. This would place the loss upon the public. However, in view
of the nominal cost to the citizen and the benefit to be derived, it is
to be questioned if this would not be the most advantageous arrangement that the citizen could make in protecting himself against
the water company's failure. The citizen in return for a few cents
increase in his water bill each month would be indemnified if his
property were destroyed as a result of the water company's failure
to perform.
Perhaps the clearest discussion of the majority rule is that of
Judge Cardozo in the case of H. R. Moch Company, Inc. v. Rensselaer
Water Company," where the problem of both contract and tort liability was presented. In tins case the defendant water company had
contracted with the city of Rensselaer for the supply of water for a
term of years. Due to the lack of water pressure, flames winch
started on an adjoining building spread to the plaintiff's building
and destroyed it. The court held that the members of the public are
not entitled to maintain an action against a water company which
has contracted with a city to furnish water at hydrants for damage
resulting from a fire due to the water company's failure to supply
sufficient pressure, as no intention appeared in the water company's
contract that it should be answerable to individual citizens for
losses ensuing from a failure to fulfill its promise.'" The court here
discussed both privity of the parties and the intention as expressed
by the contract and decided that both were lacking. The main objection raised however, was that if recovery were allowed here, the
door would be left open for all types of suits where a party had
contracted to furnish services and a third party would be benefited.
It seems that the last objection raised is more of a justification of
the conclusion reached than an analysis of the means used.
Although the courts have denied recovery for the destruction
of property they have been more lenient when the matter of water
for the household is concerned. They have held that the water companies are bound by the agreement if they do not furnish pure
"s247 N. Y. 160, 159 N. E. 896 (1928).
"Ellis v Birmingham Waterworks Co., 187 Ala. 552, 65 So.
805 (1914), Cole v. Arizona Edison Co., 53 Ariz. 141, 86 P 2d 946
(1939), Niehaus Bros. Co. v. Contra Costa Water Co., 159 Cal. 305,
113 Pac. 375 (1911)" Gnann v. Costal Public Service Co. 44 Ga.
App. 217, 160 S. E. 807 (1931)
Holloway v Macon Gaslight &
Water Co., 132 Ga. 387, 64 S. E. 330 (1909); Consolidated Biscuit
Co. v. Illinois Iowa Power Co., 303 Ill.App. 80;. 24 N. E. 2d 582
(1939); Mott v. Cherryvale Water & Manuf'g. Co., 48 Kan. 12,
28 Pac. 989 (1892) Hone v. Presque Isle Water Co., 104 Me. 217,
71 Atl. 769 (1908) Hall v. Passaic Water Co., 83 N. J. (54 Vroom)
771, 85 Atl. 349 (1912), Blunk v. Dennison Water Supply Co., 71
Ouo St. 250, 73 N. E. 210 (1905)
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water, ' refuse to furnish it at all,2 ' or attempt to raise the rate. The
similarity between the breaches is readily seen but it is admitted
that in the cases of failure to furnish pure water, the action is
either founded upon the agreement between the citizen and the
water company, or upon neglect of duty. However, where the
courts have granted mandamus ' to force the companies to furnish
the citizens water, as provided by the franchise, a different situation is presented for at the time mandamus issues the only contract in existence is that between the city and the water company.
Despite this the citizen can enforce the terms of the agreement
and compel the water company to furnish him water. If he were
an incidental beneficiary he would have no rights at all against
the promisor or promisee, therefore he must be an intended
beneficiary with the rights thereof. The logical conclusion seems
to be that if he is the intended beneficiary for one purpose, he
is for all purposes, and therefore the citizen should be able to
enforce the contract when the pressure is insufficient as well as
when there is a refusal to supply.
The most that can be said for the "lack of privity" is that
it is an arbitrary and indefinite term that is applied or rejected
as the courts see fit. In the cases of water company franchises, it
is applied to force the service to be rendered but is ignored when
the water company breaches its agreement to furnish sufficient
pressure with which to fight fires, despite the fact that both
agreements are within the same contract. The conclusion that
there is privity between the water company and the citizenry as
a whole but that there is lack of privity between the water company and the individual citizen is a fiction that is as fallacious as it is
threadbare and well illustrates the confusion that surrounds the
term.
A9 to the true intention of the parties, little doubt can be
entertained. The municipality is the central voice of the people,
created by them to serve their best interest as it appears to the
majority In the event of a breach by the municipality ' the
pecuniary loss falls upon the citizen as the money must come out
of the funds of the city treasury which have been created by the
'Martin v. Springfield City Water Co. -Mo.-, 128 S. W 2d 674
Hamilton v. Madison Water Co., 116 Me. 157, 100 Atl.
(1939)
659 (1917).
2 Home Owners Loan Corporation of Washington, D. C. v.
Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 175 Md. 676, 3 A. 2d 747
(1939); Hugen v. Albina Light & Water Co., 21 Ore. 411, 28 Pac.
244 (1891).
'
Pond v New Rochelle Water Co., 183 N. Y. 330, 76 N. E. 211
(1906).

" Hugen v.

Albina Light & Water Co., 21 Ore. 411, 28 Pac.

244 (1891).
"Chisholm Water Supply Co. v. City of Chisholm, 205 Minn.
245, 285 N. W 895 (1939).
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tax paying inhabitants. The citizens are chargeable if the mumcipality breaches, and therefore it is logical to conclude that both
parties intended that there were to be mutual obligations for
which the party breaching the agreement would be liable. It
would be a vain contract indeed if one of the parties would be
liable in case of a failure to perform while the other could disregard the terms without fear of recompense.
The increased urbanization and industrialization of the United
States make it increasingly necessary that adequate fire protection be available at all times. One small fire unchecked can grow
to such proportions that the most modern fire-fighting apparatus
cannot combat it. This makes it imperative that there be due diligence at all times by the water companies to insure an adequate
supply of water to meet such emergencies. Public policy demands
that more responsibility be shouldered by the public utilities m
order that their vigilance will be increased proportionately to-the
public need. It is, therefore, submitted that the Kentucky view is
the best method of insuring a stricter compliance with the terms
of the city's franchise guaranteeing an adequate supply of water
in case of fire. This rule does not seem too harsh as there has
been no evidence of water companies fleeing the state, but perhaps now they are furnishing the pressure agreed upon. It is
equitable and just as it gives the citizen the right to recover if
his property is destroyed by the water company's failure, but it
places no additional financial burden upon the companies for the
citizen is indemnifying them by paying increased water rates. It
is not expensive, for the water rates have not risen appreciably m
Kentucky in the last ten years and only one case has been litigated
during the same period.
The overwhelming majority is opposed to the Kentucky view,
but the cases should not be counted but weighed and reason
substituted for volume. The welfare of the public in 1947 cannot
be protected by 1870 law which is out of step with the trend of
the times, therefore the public needs should be substituted for
stare decisis and the Kentucky view adopted as the best means
of accomplishing this end.
HARRY

B.

MILLER, JR.
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